Monetary policy and the farm/nonfarm price ratio: a comparison of effects by Michael T. Belongia
30
Michael T. Belongia
Michael T. Belongia is an assistant vice president at the
Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis. James A. Chaffant, Dennis
Jansen, Thomas Grennes, Richard A. King, John S. Lapp and
David Orden made many helpful comments on earlier drafts.
Dawn Peterson, Lora Holman and Lynn Dietrich provided
research assistance.
Monetary Policy and the
FarmlNonfarm Price Ratio: A
Comparison of Effects in
Alternative Models
INCE 1974, FOLLOWING PUBLICATION of
Schuh’s “The Macroeconomics of Agriculture,”
much research effort has been devoted to deter-
mining whether and how monetary policy af-
fects the farm sector. One of the more active
areas of interest has been the question of wheth-
er changes in the money stock affect the farm!
nonfarm product relative price ratio. The reason
for this particular interest, as described by
Tweeten (1980), is that declines in the relative
price ratio represent a “cost-price squeeze” for
farmers; thus, he suggests, if contractionary
monetary policy causes farm prices to adjust
downward more quickly than farm input prices,
farm income will decline as well. Penson and
Gardner (1988), surveying the relevant literature,
conclude that the agricultural sector has borne
the brunt of adjustment costs whenever slower
money growth has occurred.
‘Chambers (1984); Starleaf, Meyers and Womack (1985);
Falk, Devadoss and Meyers (1986); Taylor and Spriggs
(1989); and Tegene (1990) found similar results. Doo Bong
Han, Jansen and Penson (1990) reaffirm the significance
of this linkage by reporting that the conditional means and
variances of agricultural prices are more closely related to
These conclusions received considerable atten-
tion in policy discussions during the mid-1980s
when real farm incomes, exports and asset values
were falling sharply. As those discussions inten-
sified, additional research reported that the
quantitative effect of monetary actions on rela-
tive farm prices was not only large but persis-
tent, if not permanent.
Among recent studies, Devadoss and Meyers
(1987), for example, report that negative money
supply shocks “harm farmers because farm
product prices decrease relatively more than
nonfarm product prices” (p. 842). Many other
studies found similar results.1
In sum, the notion that contractionary mone-
tary policy affects agricultural prices and in-
come differently than comparable measures in
the nonfarm sector’ has become one of the
the conditional means and variances of Ml than those of
industrial prices. Orden (1986a), Lapp (1990), Gardner
(1981) and Grennes and Lapp (1986), in contrast, did not
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stylized facts” of agricultural economics.2
Because neoclassical theory implies that changes
in money growth have no real consequences in
the long run, however, the large and sometimes
permanent effects of monetary actions on
agricultural prices reported in the literature
seem to present an anomaly. Recent episodes,
moreover, seem to run counter to the view that
contractionary monetary policy selectively hurts
farmers. First, real farm income rose during the
late 1980s, a period some analysts would charac-
terize as one of substantial monetary contrac-
tion.3 Second, although the dollar’s decline since
early 1985 would help expand U.S. farm ex-
ports, all other things the same, the exchange
rate depreciation has occurred at an odd time:
when monetary policy has been contractionary
and federal budget deficits have been expanding.
Although the conventional wisdom links both
factors to lower farm sector prices and income,
this result is supposed to be transmitted through
a rising value of the dollar.~
This article reviews the previous literature
linking monetary actions to the relative price of
farm products and attempts to reconcile the
conflicting theoretical and empirical approaches
that have been applied to this issue. Because
previous studies derive their empirical models
from a variety of generally noncomparable theo-
retical models, this paper highlights cases in
which the direction or significance of a particu-
lar variable’s impact differs across models. By
estimating each model with the same data and
testing each model’s implications directly, we
can better assess monetary policy’s effects on
relative farm prices and the agricultural sector.
A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Table i lists the important features of studies
that examined the effects of monetary actions
on the farm/nonfarm relative price ratio. The
most common measure of farm prices used in
these studies is the index of prices received by
farmers. The relative price issue is typically in-
2Chambers (1985).
‘Between lVll986 and 1V11990, for example, the 12-quarter
moving average growth rate of Ml declined from 10.3 per-
cent to 3.0 percent. A “trend” growth rate of Ml this low
has not been seen in nearly three decades.
4See, for example, Belongia and Stone (1985).
‘See, for example, Granger and Newbold (1974), Plosser
and Schwert (1978) and Dickey and Fuller (1979, 1981).
6Use of monthly data or producer price indexes for farm
and industrial (nonfarm) commodities does not affect the
vestigated by dividing this index by another in-
dex of either the aggregate price level or the
prices of some commodity bundle composed of
nonfarm products; in some instances, farm and
nonfarm nominal price indexes have been re-
gressed on a monetary measure individually to
identify different speeds of adjustment and
thereby infer the net impact of changes in mon-
ey growth on the selected relative price ratio.
Ml has been used almost uniformly as the in-
dicator of monetary actions.
Annual, quarterly and monthly data have been
used to estimate the empirical relationship be-
tween Ml and the relative price measure. Most
studies specify this relationship as one between
the natural logarithms of the two series, some-
thing which, in view of the more recent litera-
ture on common trends in data and spurious
regression relationships, may have given rise to
significant associations where none actually
existed.’
With the exceptions of Lapp (1990), and Gren-
nes and Lapp (1986), these studies found Ml to
have short-run effects on the farm/nonfarm
relative price ratio. Unfortunately, in many
cases, it is not easy to categorize the significance,
magnitude or persistence of these effects. Where
tested, the verdict seems about evenly split be-
tween those studies that find monetary actions
to be neutral in their effect on the long-run
relative price ratio and those that find the effects
to be permanent. The only general conclusion
that emerges from the studies summarized in
table Ii sthat the wide diversity among sample
periods, relative price measures, variable specifi-
cations and results makes it difficult to tell
whether and by how much monetary actions af-
fect the farm/nonfarm relative price ratio.
A REVIEW OF THE DATA
Figure 1 shows quarterly values for the an-
nualized percentage changes in the indexes of
prices received and prices paid by farmers since
l97b.~These indexes are based on the bundle
qualitative conclusions of this section. The plot starts in
1976 to avoid the price volatility associated both with
OPEC and U.S. farm policies in the 1973-74 period.
Moreover, the empirical work to follow begins after the
system of flexible exchange rates was adopted and most
of the one-time adjustments to new exchange rate



















A Summary of Results from Studies of the Monetary Policy-Relative Farm
Price Question
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of farm products that farmers produce and eli atile than farm input prices. A test of the equali-
and commodities that farmers purchase as pro tv of variance , for example, produces an F-
duction input , respectively! Quarterly values statistic of 7.62 against a 5 percent critical ~alue
for the growth rate of Ml also are shown in of 1.53.
this figure. Data for the individual series are
summarized in table 2. As the figure and table Figure 2 shou s changes in the ratio of the in-
sho~y,farm product prices have been more x ol- dexes plotted again t changes in \ll growth. In
7The prices received measure is a weighted index of about detail see Handbook #365, US Department of
112 farm product prices: the prices paid mea ure Is a Agriculture (1970).




















Growth of Ml, Prices Paid by Farmers, and
Prices Received by Farmers
Table 2
Descriptive Statistics for Farm and Nonfarm Prices,
Ill 976-IV/1990 (annualized first differences of logarithms,
quarterly data)
Standard
Mean deviation Minimum Maximum
P’ices received by farmers 2 22% 14 30% - 24 75% 46 74%
Prices Daid by farmers 4 74 5.18 496 15.92
Prices receuvedlprices paid —252 1238 —2635 32.18
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Figure 2
First Difference of the Ratio of Prices Received to Prices










very simple terms, these series represent the
logic in much of the literature that links mone-
tary policy to the relative price of farm pro-
ducts. For example, accelerations in money
growth are thought to be associated with in-
creases in the farm/nonfarm product price ratio.
Over this sample period, however, the simple
correlation coefficient for these series, 0.13, is
not significantly different from zero at the 5
percent significance level.
Finally, it is interesting to abstract from the
short-run volatility in these series and examine
the data for longer-run trends. Since t976, the
average growth rate of prices received by farm-
ers has been about one-half that of farm input
prices; as a consequence, the relative farm price
ratio has fallen at an annual rate of more than
°SeeMeltzer (1990) for a thorough review of U.S. monetary
policy since the mid-1960s, with special emphasis on its
tendency to produce increasing rates of money growth.
2.5 percent. Conversely) Ml has grown over the
sample period at an annual average rate of 7.03
percent. From a long-run perspective, the down-
ward trend in the relative price ratio is consis-
tent with what Tweeten has called a “cost-price
squeeze” for farmers. The origin of this squeeze,
however, does not seem to be related to the
relatively expansionary long-run course of
monetary policy.~
MONEY GROWTH AND RELATIVE
PRICES: ALTERNATIVE
THEORETICAL RESULTS
The research attempting to link monetary ac-
tions to relative farm price changes has not






















affect the farm/nonfarm price ratio; instead, the
direction, size and persistence of this effect have
been its primary focus. Because alternative theo-
retical models produce different empirical speci-
fications and, quite possibly, different results,
some attempt must be made to distinguish
among these alternatives. For guidance on these
issues, the testable implications of three models
used to investigate the money-relative price
question are developed below.
Model 1: A Change in Money
Growth as a Shock to Aggregate
Demand
Equilibrium “Barro-type” models assume that
anticipated changes in the money stock affect
9See, for example, Barro (1976).
Figure 3
Graphical Representation of a Barro-type Model
MODEL I.
Farm Commodities Market Non-farm Commodities Market
~NF
Model Assumptions and Predicted Result:An unanticipated decrease In money growth causes the demands
for both farm and nonfarm commodities to fall. Because the income elasticity of farm commodity demand
is assumed to be lower than that for nonfarm products, the decrease in farm product demand is smaller.
Assuming identical supply elasticities in the two markets, AP~ < APNF and ~ ~ rises.
all nominal prices equi-proportionally and there-
fore leave relative prices unchanged.~Relative
prices are affected in these models only by an
unexpected change in the money stock. In model
~l, illustrated in figure 3, an unanticipated
decline in the money stock produces a negative
shock to aggregate demand as people find
themselves with a shortage of real money bal-
ances and an excess supply of goods. Their col-
lective actions to restore equilibrium by reduced
spending shifts aggregate demand to the left.
This shift lowers output and income temporarily
and the price level permanently.
If supply elasticities in the farm and nonfarm
sectors are identical, this demand shift will af-












of demand for farm and nonfarm products dif-
fer. If the income elasticity for farm products is
lower than that for nonfarm products, an unex-
pected decrease in the money stock would in-
crease temporarily the relative price of farm
products.” This interpretation of the model,
therefore, predicts a response that is contrary
to the story embedded in the “stylized facts” of
agricultural economics. Because the direction of
relative price change will vary with the par-
ticular assumptions about shifts in supply and
demand across markets, the “sign” on this effect
in a regression equation offers a direct way to
test the implications of this one interpretation
of the model.
The predictions of this model, however, deny
that monetary contractions are a source of long-
lasting harm to the farm sector. In this case, as
in the other examples that follow, the real in-
come effect is a short-run phenomenon. When
people realize that the real demand for in-
dividual products has not changed fundamental-
ly but that, instead, the monetary contraction
caused a general decline in aggregate demand,
the aggregate price level will fall to restore the
original equilibrium and relative price ratio.
Thus, because the decrease in the money stock
is reflected only in a lower aggregate price level
in the long run, the neutrality of monetary ac-
tions is preserved. In this model, as well as in
model #2 that follows, whether the relative price
ratio rises or falls and whether it returns to its
original value in the long run are the model’s
testable hypotheses. As shown in table I,
however, the long-run neutrality proposition has
not been tested in many previous studies or,
when violated, often has not been discussed.”
Model 2: Relative Price Changes
Caused by Djfferent Elasticities of
Supply
A slightly different variant of the equilibrium
Barro model, which predicts a relative price
change in the opposite direction from the pre-
vious discussion, is based on different assump-
tions about the structure of the farm and non-
farm goods markets. In this model, illustrated in
figure 4, the short-run elasticity of supply of
farm products is argued to be less than that of
nonfarm products because of differences in the
production processes’2 With long lags between
planting and breeding decisions and product
marketings, the ability to adjust farm output in
the short run is assumed to be limited. Other
things the same, this characteristic of farm pro-
duction would cause the farm/nonfarm relative
price ratio initially to fall in response to a
negative aggregate demand shock. Again, the cx
istence of long-run neutrality is a testable pro-
position and the length of the adjustment pro-
cess must be determined empirically. This
model’s predictions, however, are consistent
with the argument that the relative price of
farm products will fall under a contractionary
monetary policy.
Model 3: Price Stickiness and
“Overshooting”
So far, prices in both the farm output and in-
put markets were assumed to be flexible in
response to changes in other variables that af-
fect them. Thus, changes in the relative price
ratio depended on the relative magnitudes of
shifts in supply and demand and the slopes of
those curves; they were not influenced by dif-
ferent speeds of adjustment in the two markets.
Another approach to this question has relied on
some degree of price-stickiness in nonfarm
prices to explain changes in the relative price
ratio.
By adapting the overshooting model from the
exchange rate literature, as illustrated in figure
5, this analysis assumes that prices in the flexi-
ble price (farm) sector adjust to a monetary
change more quickly than other prices in the
fixed price (nonfarm) sector.13 So, for example,
while long-term contracts prevent nonfarm
prices from adjusting downward immediately in
response to a monetary contraction (as they
would in the Barro-type model), the auction
market characteristics of the determination of
farm prices force them to fall quickly and, con-
sequently, temporarily reduce the farm/nonfarm
relative price ratio as well. ‘rhus, again in the
short run, a negative monetary change causes a
temporary reduction in farm prices relative to
nonfarm prices.
‘°Historically,this assumption has been supported by the
data with estimates of the income elasticity for food de-
mand near 0.2 and higher estimates for nonfood items;
see King (1979) for a review of this literature.
‘1Exceptions are Bessler (1984) and Robertson and Orden
(1990).
“See, for example, Starleaf (1982).
13See, for example, Frankel (1986) or Rausser (1985).
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Figure 4





As in Model I, an unanticipated decrease in money growth decreases the demands both for farm and
nonfarm products; here, however, the decreases are assumed to be equal. Under these conditions, a lower
elasticity of supply for farm products will cause APE> LPNF and (P~ ‘~NF)will fall. Note that combining the
results of Model I with Model II produces an ambiguous result because differences in the sizes of demand
shifts may be large enough to cause an increase, a decrease, or no change in (Pff/PNF).
Although this predicted direction of relative
price change is the same as in model #2, the
mechanics of price stickiness allows the
possibility that fully anticipated monetary
changes (as well as unexpected changes) can af-
fect the relative price ratio. Thus, testing for
the significance of expected monetary changes
on the relative price ratio provides a direct way
to discriminate between the two models. Unfor-
tunately, the converse is not true: failing to find
significant effects from anticipated monetary
changes does not necessarily reject an over-
shooting type of model because its mechanics
can be set in motion solely by monetary sur-
prises as in the previous cases.
RECONCILING ALTERNATIVE
THEORIES
The foregoing discussion showed that farm
prices are significantly more variable than non-
farm prices, and that the farm/nonfarm relative
price ratio has declined persistently over time.
Unfortunately, the implications of our three
models differed considerably in terms of the ex-
pected direction of change in the relative price
of farm products to nonfarm products as well
as the mechanism by which a monetary action
influenced this ratio. To resolve this conundrum,
each model was estimated using identical data
sets to see which one’s implications are best
supported by the results.
These estimations are intended to provide
evidence on three aspects of the possible mone-
tary influences on the farm/nonfarm relative
price ratio. The first piece of evidence is the
direction of relative price change; this will
discriminate between model #1 vs. models #2
and #3 The second piece of evidence is the
statistical significance of the relationship, where
the significance of a variable can be viewed as




























Schedule EE shows all possible equilibrium relationships
between P~ and PNF prior to the change in monetary
policy. Slower money growth, which is disinflationary,
shifts EE to E’E’ where farm (flex) prices (PF) decrease
but nonfarm (fix) prices (PNF) do not adjust; thus, PF
“overshoots” from point A to point B. As fix-price
markets adjust, (PF/PNF) gradually returns to the long-run
equilibrium at point C.
1Adopted from R. Dornbusch, Open Economy Macro-
economics, Fig. 11-8, p. 208.
third piece of evidence is the magnitude of the
impact that a given monetary change has on the
relative price ratio; here, it is recognized that
monetary effects may be statistically significant
and yet still be quantitatively unimportant.
VjIR Estinxation
As a first step in the investigation, a vector
autoregressive (VAR) model was estimated. A
VAR, which can be used to determine the
amount of variation in the relative price ratio
that one might attribute to monetary shocks, is
useful in gauging the strength of the hypothe-
sized relationship. It has the additional advan-
tage of not requiring the specification of any
particular functional form among the variables
included in the model. The VAR and other
equations that follow were estimated with quar.
terly, seasonally adjusted data over the 1/1978-





Efluences on the relative price ratio, they do cap-
ture other influences affecting prices in the
farm and nonfarm product markets so that the
remaining variation can be explained by
changes in Ml growth and the past history of
the relative price ratio itself. These variables
also were chosen because they have been used
in previous work and our interest is in stressing
comparability with other studies. All variables
were specified as first differences of logarithms.”
of prices received by farmers divided by either the index
of input prices paid by farmers or the all-item CPI. The
possible effects of exports on relative prices also was in-
vestigated by replacing the real exchange rate index with
the real quantity of U.S. farm exports. In no case,
however, were the qualitative conclusions discussed in the
text affected by this change: Ml growth never had a
significant effect on the relative price ratio and the effects
of trade flows were significant only if significance levels
beyond the standard 5 percent level were used.
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Table 3
Single-Equation Results for the VAR Estimation, I/i976-IV/i990
Explanatory Variables
Dependent Relative Exchange Industrial -
variable prices Ml rate production A DW
Relalive pr:ce 0206 0031 —0233 —0 147 12 I 98
(1.0891 (0064) (1 735) (0.413)
Ml 0015 0626 -0020 —0257 28 1.96
(0257) (4 192) (0488) (2.340)
Exchangerale 0451 -0046 0499 —0137 09 204
i1674~ fOO7S~ f29291 fO 3021
Industrial produclion 0131 0344 0.003 0515 29 201
~1690~ fl 737~ (0063)
NOTE l-stal~slics i-i parentheses apply to sums 01 lag coef4t.ents and apply to lhe null hypolhesis




















troduction to the more specific testing to follow,
the VAR can offer some insights to the strength
of the money-relative price link.
The VAR model included four variables: the
farm/nonfarm price ratio (as measured by the
ratio of the indexes of prices received by farm-
ers to the producer price index), Ml, the index
of industrial production and the real trade-
weighted exchange rate. Variables other than
Ml were included because observed changes in
the relative price ratio may have other origins.
For example, technological changes in the non-
farm sector (which would affect industrial
prices) or export demand (which could have
varying effects across the farm and nonfarm
sectors) could affect the relative price ratio in
isolation from monetary changes.” While these
other measures do not exhaust the list of in-
Sums of lagged coefficients and t-statistics for
these sums for the single equation estimation
are reported in table 3. The results of interest
indicate that Ml growth is not related signifi-
cantly to changes in the relative price of farm
products.” One possible explanation for this
result is that flows from farm inventories, which
were historically large over most of the sample
“Evaluating the impact of the industrial production measure
here also will serve as an additional check on the over-
shooting model, which includes an output measure as an
explanatory variable and predicts a positive relationship
with the relative price ratio.
‘~A likelihood ratio test suggested by Sims (1980) was
employed to select a single lag length for all variables in
each of the four equations in the VAR representation. This
test indicated a choice of two quarters.
“The estimations reported in tables 3 and 4 also were per-
formed using relative price measures defined as the index
liii WA1 ifli ~QT Iriol40
Table 4
VAR Variance Decomposition: Four-, Eight- and 12-Quarter-
Ahead Forecast Error Variances
Innovations Series
Dependent Relative Exchange Industrial
variable prices Ml rate production
Re’ative prce 81 62 0.72 8.11 9.54
81.28 093 815 964
8128 093 815 965
Ml 542 79.14 281 12.63
687 76.11 275 1427
690 7604 2.75 1430
Exchange rate 6.30 714 8478 1.79
647 733 8424 196
648 733 8420 198
Industrial product.on 29.59 13.51 275 54.16
2892 1510 3.05 5293
2893 15.12 3.05 5291
NOTE Row 1 = Four.quarte’-ahead forecast error
Row 2 = Eight-quarte’-aheaa forecast erro’
Row 3 = 12-quarter-anead forocasi error
period, offset any relative price change caused
by an aggregate shock.
Only the real exchange rate, which has a
marginally significant and negative coefficient, is
satistically associated with the relative price
ratio. While this result is consistent with many
of the arguments raised by agricultural econo-
mists about how restrictive monetary policy
could raise the exchange rate, reduce exports
and depress farm prices, this line of reasoning
is not shown by line 3 of table 3, which indi-
cates no statistically significant relationship be-
tween Ml and the real exchange rate. Thus,
these reduced-form estimates suggest that
monetary changes have little, if any, effect on
the relative price ratio.
Variance Decomposition
Further evidence about the effect of monetary
shocks on relative prices is found in table 4,
which presents the percentage of four-, eight-
and 12-quarter-ahead forecast error variances
explained by past innovations in the relative
price ratio and the other variables in the
model.’~
Monetary shocks explain less than 1 percent
of the relative price forecast error variance,
while about 81 percent is attributable to past in-
novations in the relative price series itself.
These findings are generally consistent with
those reported by Chambers (1984) and Orden
(198Gb), who found less than 10 percent of the
error variance could be attributed to monetary
shocks and more than half could he attributed
to past behavior of the relative price ratio.”
Moreover, both the real exchange rate and in-
dustrial production explain substantially more of
the variation in the relative price ratio than
does Ml.
As noted earlier, other analysts (most notably
Schuh) have argued monetary effects are trans-
‘7Because VAR results are sensitive to the ordering of
variables [e.g., Cooley and Lefloy(1985)), the table con-
tains the results from the ordering that gives the largest
potential influence for Ml.
“Devadoss and Meyers (1987), who reported large and
quite persistent monetary effects on relative prices, did not
report a variance decomposition, so their results are not
directly comparable.
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mitted to agriculture through the real exchange
rate and its impact on farm exports. Some in-
sight into this notion is found in table 4, which
shows that innovations in the real exchange
rate series account for about 8 percent of the
variance in relative farm prices. Moreover, mon-
etary shocks apparently explain only about 7
percent of the variance in real exchange rate
movements, a result consistent with the small
or non-significant effects of monetary shocks on
the real exchange rate reported by Batten and
Belongia (1986). Tl’hus, all things and potential
avenues of influence considered, these results
indicate a statistically weak and numerically
small relationship between monetary shocks and
movements in the farm/nonfarm price ratio.
The shaded insert on page 42 discusses possible
changes in these relationships if the thrust of
monetary policy is measured by different
indicators.
Estimates From a Barro-Type
Model
While the foregoing results suggest a fairly
weak relationship between monetary shocks
and relative price changes, the VAR method is
not appropriate for testing the relevant struc-
tural hypotheses that characterize the models
discussed above. In a model that treats a mone-
tary shock as a shock to aggregate demand,
assuming a lower income elasticity for farm
products would imply that, in the short run, the
farm/nonfarm relative price ratio is inversely
related to innovations in Ml. Moreover, because
neoclassical models of this nature recognize that
nominal shocks affect real or relative magni-
tudes only in the short run, the sum of the
coefficients for lagged innovations in Ml should
not be significantly different fi-om zero. The
persistence of any short-run nonneutralities,
ho%vever, remains to be determined.
The basic predictions of this model can he ex-
amined by estimating an equation of the form:
P . q -
(1) At1iH = a + I b~E(m), + I c~Em —E(m)],_~
NF 10
+
growth, and a, b1 and c~are coefficients to be
estimated over undetermined lag lengths p and
q, respectively. Under the assumptions about
market structure discussed earlier, the b, coeffi-
cients should be zero and the cj coefficients for
the initial lags of unexpected changes in money
growth should take negative values; the model’s
general prediction about the long-run neutrality
of monetary shocks implies that the sum of c1
coefficients should be zero. Lapp (1990), who
recently discussed and reported results from a
model of this form, found monetary actions to
have small, short-lived effects on the relative
price ratio.1’
Before equation 1 can be estimated, the re-
quisite values for the aggregate demand shock
(the unexpected component of Ml growth) must
be obtained. An autoregressive model was fit to
the first differences of logarithms of Ml and in-
spection of the autocorrelation functions in-
dicated an AR(6) was an adequate representa-
tion of this series. The null hypothesis that the
residuals from this representation were white
noise could not be rejected. These residuals
were employed in equation 1 as the measure of
monetary shocks; the fitted values were used to
represent anticipated money growth.
A final prediction error (FPE) criterion sug-
gested estimating a model with contem-
poraneous and three lagged values for the
unanticipated component of money growth and
excluding the anticipated portion of money
growth entirely. Before estimating equation I in
this form, it first was estimated using contem-
poraneous and three lagged values for both
monetary variables in order to test more di-
rectly whether anticipated money gro%vth had
any effect on relative prices. As the first row of
table S indicates, neither component of money
growth is related significantly to the farm/non-
farm product ratio. The second row of the
table, which reports the results of the model
chosen by the FPE criterion, shows that
monetary shocks have no permanent effects on
the relative price ratio. Moreover, none of the
individual lag coefficients (not reported) is
significantly different from zero indicating the
below); rather, the significance of those coefficients is a
key hypothesis to be tested. Moreover, by failing to specify
a theoretical model, Devadoss and Meyers also miss the
chance to rule out a Barro-type model as an explanation
for relative price behavior on the basis of “wrong”


















where E(m) is the expected growth rate of Ml,
Em — E(m)] is the unexpected component of Ml
“Equation I, in many respects, is the one Devadoss and
Meyers (1987), among others, estimated after placing zero
restrictions on the b1 coefficients. If, however, their results
are explained by a fix-price/flex-price (overshooting)
economic structure, fully anticipated changes in the money
stock could affect the relative price ratio and there is no
)ustification for the restrictions (see equations 2 and 3
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iearing rhn.ka I)le deposits. ~‘ Iiich Iiian 1x~a i Ing mhtt k a bI , deposits, prest’ma hl~
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ol Xl I since I 981) Other reseait-h has aigued is mtencltcl to bC a tiaiistctions-hasetl
that another nwasui-e of 1-ecleral Resect e nieasiire of the nioiwt stock Indeed. l)arhv.
actions—the federal funds iate -—is more close— el al (1981)1 lotincJ XII A Ic) 1w a better em—
Iv related to (‘COiloImlic activity than lllt)flt’V P~’”~1 nieasurt of mnurmctamv actions ill tui.’
growth- indeed. Ui-den and hirkler (19891. in 198th than \I1 . 1 sing the ledet al fminCln flIt’
a similar stutlt’ of mont-lam-v acliomis and I lie car, he defended by arguing that il e.\anulurs
telatit e pm’itt (it tai’mn pri)(lLlCts speculate the influence oF an interest rate that in diipci—
about \\ bet her inc-rest rates aje a better lv under I lie c:ontrol of the 1-ederal Resei~ V.
gauge of nlonelal-v .utioim than mont-v 11w reletant jesuIts of these estimation, are
gro~t lii— reported in the table helmt
Revised VAR Estimates Using M1A and the Federal Funds Rate
As Monetary Indicators: I/1976-IV/1990
Revised Reduced-Form Estimates
Dependent Relative Monetary Exchange Industrial -
variable price indicator rate production R DW
Relahve pncc 0215 0019 0237 --0 167 .12 I
p 124~ ~0036; (1 488.1 10 471)
Rc~aUveprice 0213 - 27182 —0210 0.034 15 1 96
(1 145i 11.404) (1694) ~009’j
Revised Variance Decompositions
Dependent Relative Monetary Exchange Industrial Forecast
variable price indicator - production horizon
Refatve once 81.70 1.48’ 7.53 929 4 Ot’.
81.05 221 147 927 8Olr
8104 221 747 927 l2Qtr
Relative prcc- 7819 8942 360 928 4 Qtr
7781 909 362 947 SQtr.
77.81 9.09 362 947 12 Qtr
‘Monetary mercator :5 In M1A
2
Monetary indicator :s . ted funds rale.
See br example. Belongia and chaltanr f1990~ for a ~~omplete results are available from the author
review of some of the issues.
2Seo Friedman and Kuttner (1990) for arguments and
evidence on the federal funds rate as an ndrcator of
monetary policyThe hypotheses embodied in equations 2 and
3 were tested over the same periods reported
earlier Real output was measured by industrial
production The change in the expected money
growth rate, Ap, was calculated as the first dif
ference of fitted values from the money growth
autoregression discussed earlier The equations
first were fit only with contemporaneous values
for right-hand-side variables and then, again,
allowing for lags. Results of the estimations are
reported in table 6
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rue lop pom-tion of the table. ~t hic h r-.-ports i dat it e’ price ratio Sinimlarh the botton, por-
the i enised r’educed-fo i m equations using the lion of the table- indii atc’s that iic-itliei
growth i-ate of XII A and hanges in tlit- 11101Idtat-v imiteator explains runt-c- than 10
eclei-aI funds rate as monetaiv indicators, peicent of tlu I oteca si erm-ol variance and
shows no qualita Lit e change to the result a in that mm ementsi nthe relative price ratio
table 3: ne ither indic -ator of inonetat-~ actions c-onti mtue to I II’ dominated by past shot Ks to
is relatcad signifliaut lv to mmemen t si nthe the ratio itself
assumes that nonfarm prices are fixed in the
short run, also would imply that contractionary
monetary policy would temporarily depress the
farm/nonfarm relative price ratio, a result op
posite to that from model #1
Finally, some analysts have tried to account
for business cycle effects on farm prices by ad-
ding the change in the log level of real output
(Ay1) to equation 2 This gives equation 3:
(3)AP~ = c0 + c1 Am1 + c2Ap1 + c3 Ay1
+
Note that equation 3 maintains the two original
overshooting hypotheses implied by equation 2




















absence of short-run effects as well If monetary
actions have any effect on the farm/nonfarm
price ratio, the results in table S reject the no-
tion that they are transmitted through the mech-
anism described in figure 3
The Over8hooting Itfodel
The implications of the overshooting model,
derived in Frankel (1986), can be stated in a
straightforward manner The testable hypotheses
implied by the model shown in equation 2 are
that a change in the log level of the money
stock (Am1) or in the expected growth rate of
money (AM:) will have larger-than-proportional
effects on farm prices That is, in a regression
of the form,
(2) AP11 c0 + c1 Am1 + c, AM1 +
where AP11 is the change in the log level of the
index of prices received by farmers, the ex-
pected results are that c1
> 1 and c2
> 1
Thus, overshooting” occurs because farm
prices respond initially by a larger percentage
than either the actual level of the money stock
or the expected rate of money growth. The
standard interpretation of this model, which
Table 5
Effects of Monetary Shocks on Relative Prices in a Barro Model
Intercept Expected M Unexpected M R DW
--25 862 3.371 —2298 — 03 151
(1 604} 11.473) 10.909)
0-3 0-3
-2211 —- 0493 —01 148
(1 237) 10535)
0-3
NOTE- The third line of numbers in each row of the table :ndicates lags estimated The numbers :n
parentheses are t-stat-stcs for the sum of the lag coefficients
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Table 6
Results from Overshooting Models, l/1976-IV/1990
Intercept Am A~a Ay DW
— 0.071 0.350 0 381 — — .01 1.56
(0.20) (0.80) (0 49)
— 1 662 0 248 0.283 0.793 08 1.60
(0 47) (0 59) (0 38) (2 58)
526 —0485 0.120 0685 .23 138
(1.36) (1 01) (017) (1.77)
0-1 0 0-1
NOTE. The third line of numbers in the bottom row of the table indicates lags estimated Numbers
in parentheses for bottom regression are tstatislmcs for the sums of the lag coefficients
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certainly important to the debate about whether
farm programs can or should be used to cushion
the sector from changes in macroeconomic
policies, the evidence on the response of farm
prices and income to monetary policy actually
has been widely mixed. In part, this diversity
has been due to the different theoretical models
and empirical techniques that have been
employed.
Following a research strategy suggested by
King (1979) to distinguish among alternative
models and empirical results, a revised set of
“stylized facts” emerges on the relationship bet-
ween monetary actions and the relative price of
farm products:
• Farm prices are significantly more variable
than nonfarm prices.
• VAR results consistently show that monetary
innovations explain less than 10 percent of
the forecast error variance of the farm/non-
farm price ratio, whereas past innovations in
the relative price ratio itself explain 80 per-
cent or more of the error variance. Thus,
while monetary effects may be statistically
significant, they are economically
unimportant.
• Although the flex-price/fix-price model is
widely asserted to represent the economic
structure generating the farm/nonfarm price
series, its main hypotheses are rejected by
the data. The standard interpretation of a




Because many studies have found monetary
shocks to have positive and persistent effects on
the farm/nonfarm relative price ratio, the pur-
suit of a contractionary monetary policy to
reduce inflation has been blamed for causing
widespread financial distress in agriculture.
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